## 1AC

### Part 1 - Framing

First, The 1AC is a politics of invention, a rupture within the traditional schema which plague the very ground we rest on which unshackles us from static notions of history and recognizes identity as fluid not fixed. It a revolution which introduces new performances into the world - we adopt this positionality in the 1AC as an invitation to adopt This standpoint and invent further alternatives.

Marriott in **‘**14, [Marriott, David. "No lords A-leaping: Fanon, CLR James, and the politics of invention." Humanities 3.4 (2014): 517-545. SK]

“I should constantly remind myself”, writes Fanon, “that **the real leap consists in introducing invention into existence**” ([1], p. 229). And just before this sentence: “I am not a prisoner of History [l’Histoire]. I should not seek there for the meaning of my destiny” ([1], p. 229). In all of Fanon’s writings I know of no passage that sums up, to the same extent, the enigma of his thought. The point of these gestures seems to be that “invention”, so often invoked as though it were eo ipso something historical, is here the figure for a kind of radical untimeliness that entails a leap, and **this leap** cannot be anticipated, nor can it be prepared for, nor **can[not] it be traced back to a prior historical moment to be interrogated as such**. To leap, then, is more than a rhetorical figure; indeed, we need to see it as the very conceptuality that Fanon puts into play here, as that which cuts through the continuum of history: and in its wake only remnants remain. Fanon needs to remind himself of this. He needs to remind himself of the devastating consequences of invention and of history. (In this he is closely related to Benjamin, whose angelus novus is just as essentially a figure of danger and hope (cf. [2])). **Invention, because it is a radical transformation, is not reducible to** economy or strategy, and therefore, we might want to say, yet another form of **political calculation**. Nor is it a mode for utopia, whose possibility can now be resurrected in a myth of perfectibility, when the oppressed take a dialectical leap into the “open air of history” ([2], p. 253). This is why **invention is not reducible to any kind of teleological schema**. **Despite the primary role which history plays in the meaning of colonial subjection**, **clinging to its truth or whatever happens to be regarded as its truth can only be imprisoning**, **or backward-looking, for the inventor**. Although none of Fanon’s texts are explicitly devoted to this configuration, the ethical-political implications of invention can be seen throughout Fanon’s work, although it is less obvious what these implications might be. I want to argue that **this situation is already inventive, insofar as it gives rise in Fanon’s work to a singular politics of invention, and one premised on a leap that is neither a catastrophe or fall, advent or realization and is mostly incomprehensible to what came before.** From there it is but a step to the notion that invention is revolution **and that the true task of politics is to** embrace or demand **this imperious leap.** **Political reinvention**, on this view, **begins with interruption or fracture**, **and not memory or recollection**, **and cannot but appear as violent to the use of traditional concepts**, in politics, **of negation and affirmation**. Therefore, if one says—as Fanon has just said—that this invention can never be “enslaved” by the past, and its meaning circumscribed by history, **what the leap implies is a situation of radical indecision whose emergence introduces something entirely new into the world.** Humanities 2014, 3 519 To do justice to Fanon’s thinking one must therefore never lose sight of **invention**—which, to be sure, **opens up a fracture or hole in History.** **This more explicitly radical opening can be characterized as taking place in a space between a “phenomenological” critique of race** (including the space given to race by Césaire or Sartre), **and a “political” attempt to retrieve a sense of rebellion that avoids the “pitfalls” of spontaneity**: vengeance, indiscipline, an immediacy which is both “radical and totalitarian” ([3], p. 105). Fanon wants both to register the force of phenomenology’s (or more radically) Sartre’s suspicion of historicism in the traditional figuring of black invention, and Césaire’s powerful claim, in his Cahier, that blackness be re-considered first as anti-invention, prior to what he calls the purity of its failure. There is, however, a caveat: Sartre’s rendering of negritude slams the door shut on black creativity and encloses it in an historicism; and in Césaire, black existence, whose meaning plunges from abyss to mythical abyss, finds a last refuge in a “‘bitter brotherhood’ that imprisons all of us alike” ([1], p. 124). The reference to Césaire seems almost as essential to Fanon as the reference to Sartre, and one way of tracking a path through Fanon’s work is to follow the great chapter in Black Skin, White Masks devoted to Césaire’s Cahier and Sartre’s Orphée Noir. In this chapter on le vecu noir, or black lived experience, the focus is on how Sartre reduces black creativity to neo-Marxist truth or dogma and how Césaire renders black existence in terms of predetermined myths. Both **positions**, incidentally, are felt to be imprisoning: they **cease being inventive the moment they sublate the heterogeneous and singular into fixed ontologies or concepts**. SK

Second, language has no meaning independent of cultural context which conspire to indoctrinate the imperial subject under that mode of language – as such, attempting to force some interpretation of linguistic terms in the resolution or a cultural norm upon us as a way to resist the standpoint of the AC merely reifies these biases - allow us to leverage my offense against T and Theory

Fanon in ’52, [Fanon, Frantz. Black skin, white masks. Grove press, 1986, Remastered published in 2008. SK]

·**To speak means to be in a position to use a certain syntax**, to grasp the morphology of this or that language, **but it means above all to assume a culture, to support** 17 18 / Black Skin, White Mash the weight of **a civilization**. Since the situation is not one-way only, the statement of it should reflect the fact. Here the reader is asked to concede certain points that, however unaceptable they may seem in the beginning, will find the measure of their validity in the facts. The problem that we cqnfront in this chapter is this: The Negro of the Antilles will be proportionately w:hiter -that is, he will come closer to being a real human being -in direct ratio to his mastery of the French language. I am not unaware that this is one of man's attitudes face tO face with Being. -A man who has a language consequently possesses the world expressed and implied by that language. What we are getting at becomes plain: **Mastery of language affords remarkable power**. Paul Valery knew this, for he called language "the god gone astray in the Besh."1 In a work now in preparation I propose to investigate this phenomenon.2 For the moment I want to show why **the Negro** of the Antilles, whoever he is, **has always to face the problem of language**. Furthermore, I will broaden the field of this description and through the Negro of the Antilles include every colonized man. **Every colonized people**-in other words, **every people in whose soul an inferiority complex has been created by the death and burial of its local cultural** **originality finds itself face to face with the language of the civilizing nation;** that is, with the culture of the mother country. **The colonized is elevated above his jungle status in proportion to his adoption of the mother country's cultural standards.** **He [or she] becomes whiter as he [or she] renounces his [or her] blackness**, his jungle. In the French colonial army, and particularly in the Senegalese regiments, the black officers serve 1. Charmes (Paris, Gallimard, 1952). 2. Le langage et ragressioit~. Frantz Fanon I 19 first of all as interpreters. They are used to convey the master's orders to their fellows, and they too enjoy a certain position of honor. There is the city, there is the country. There is the capital, there is the province. Apparently the problem in the mother country is the same. Let us take a Lyonnais in Paris: He boasts of tlJe quiet of his city, the intoxicating beauty of the quays of the Uhonc, the splendor of the plane trees, and all those other things that fascinate people who have nothing to do. If you meet him again when he has returned from Paris, and especially if you do not know the capital, he will never run out of its praises: Paris-city-of-light, the Seine, the little garden restaurants, know Paris and die. . . . SK

Also means that any form of assimilation tactics are detrimental to subjects who are oppressed.

Third, action in order to defeat this form of cultural indoctrination and assimilation must be one that seeks to break down the societal and structural biases – we must educate others about these biases and give others the choice to choose rather than force them to act a certain way

Fanon in ’52, [Fanon, Frantz. Black skin, white masks. Grove press, 1986, Remastered published in 2008. SK]

1. My patient is suffering from an inferiority complex. His psychic structure is in danger of disintegration. What has ~9\_.b~~one is to save him from this and, little by little, ~o ~<fhunof this unconscious desire. (~ **If [one]** he **is overwhelmed to such a degree by the wish to be white, it is because he [or she] lives in a society that makes his [or her] inferiority complex possible**, **in a society that derives its. stability from the perpetuation of this complex**, in a society **that proclaims the superiority of one race**; to the identical degree to which that society creates difficulties ~or him, he will find himself thrust into a neurotic situation. **What emerges then is the need for combined action on the individual and on the group**.\_ As a psychoanalyst, I should help my patient to become conscious of his unconscious and abandon his attempts at a hallucinatory whitening, but also to act in the direction of a change in !Jte social structure. In other words, **the black man [or woman] should no long~ be con- confronted by the dilemma**, **turn white or disappear**; **but he [or she] should be able to take cognizance of a possibility of existence**. In still other words, **if society makes difficulties for him [or her] because of his [or her] color**, if in his dreams l establish the expression of an unconscious desire to change color, **my objective will not be that of dissuading him [or her] from it by advising him to keep his [or her] place** .. ; **On .the contrary, my objective**, once his motivations have been brought into consciousness, **will be to put-him [or her] in ·a position. to ·choose action**,( or passivity) **with respect to the real source of the conflict** -that is, toward **the social structures**. SK

Fourth, This assimilation ideology then produces negrophobia in dominant ways of knowing and being, a fear and hatred of blacks, which turns into unconscious, unvoiced biases. This is the root cause of all other hatred towards blacks.

Fanon in ’52, [Fanon, Frantz. Black skin, white masks. Grove press, 1986, Remastered published in 2008. SK]

If what has been said thus far is grasped, this conclusion may be stated: It is nonnal for the Antillean to be anti-Negro. Through the collective unconscious the Antillean has taken over all the archetypes belonging to the European. The tll'lima of the Antillean Negro is almost always a white woman. In the same way, the anlmw of the Antilleans is always a: white man. That is because in the works of Anatole France, Balzac, Bazin, or any of the rest of "our" novelists, there is never a word about an ethereal yet ever present black woman or about a dark Apollo with sparkling eyes .... But I too am guilty, here I am talking of Apollo! There is no help for it: **I am a white man**. **For unconsciously I distrust** what is blade in me, that is, **the whole of my being**. I am a Negro-but of course I do not know it, simply because I am one. When I am at home my mother sings me French love songs in which there is never a word about Negroes. **When I disobey, when I make too much noise, I am told to "stop acting** like a nigger." Somewhat later I read white books and little by little I take into myself the prejudices, the myths, the folklore 192 I Bltick Skin, White Moiks that have come to me from Europe. But I will not accept them all, since certain prejudices do not apply in the Antilles. Anti-Semitism. for instance, does not exist there. for there are no Jews. or virtually none. Without turning to the idea of collective catharsis, it would be easy for me to show that, **without thinking, the Negro selects himself as an object capable of carrying the burden of original sin**. **The white man chooses the black man for this function**, and the black man who is white also chooses the b1aclt man. **The black** Antillean **is the slave of this cultural imposition** . .**After having been the slave of the white man, he [or she] enslaves himself [or herself].** The Negro is in every sense of the word a victim of white civilization. It is not surprising that the artistic creations of Antillean poets bear no special watermark: These men are white. To come back to psychopathology, let us say that the Negro lives an ambiguity that is extraordinarily neurotic. At the age of twenty-at the time, that is, when the collective unconscious has been more or less lost, or is resistant at least to being raised to the conscious level-the Antillean recognizes that he is living an error. Why is that? Quite simply because-and this is very important-the Antillean has recognized himself as a Negro, but, by virtue of an ethical transit, he also feels {collective unconscious) that one is a Negro to the degree to which one is wicked, sloppy, malicious, instinctual. Everything that is the opposite of these Negro modes of behavior is white. **This must be recognized as the source of Negrophobia** in the Antillean. In the collective unconscious, black =ugliness, sin, darkness, immorality. In other words, he is Negro who is immoral. If I order my life like that of a moral man, I simply am not a Negro. Whence the Martinican custom of saying of a worthless white man that he has "a nigger soul.• Color is nothing, I do not even notice it, I know only one thing, which is the Frt.lfllz FGROn I 193 purity of my conscience and the whiteness of my soul. "Me white like snow," the other said. **Cultural imposition is easily accomplished** in MartiDique. The ethical transit encounters no obstacle. But **the real white man** is waiting for me. As soon as possible he **will tell me that it is not enough to try to be white, but that a white totality must be achieved**. It is only then that I .shall recognize the betrayal. -Let us conclude. An Antillean is made white by the collective unconscious, by a large part of his individual unconscious, and by the virtual totality of his mechanism of individuation. The color of his skin, of which there is no mention in Jung. is black. All the inabilities to understand are born of this blunder •. While he was in France, studying for his degree in literature, ce&aire •discovered his cowardice." He knew that it was cowardice, but he could never say why. He felt that it was ridiculous, idiotic, I might say even unhealthy, but in none of his writings can one trace the mechanism of that cowardice. That is because what was necessary was to shatter the current situation and to try to apprehend reality with the soul of a child. The Negro in the streetcar was fwmy and ugly. Certainly ce&aire Jaughed at him. That was because there was nothing in common between himself and this authentic Negro. A handsome Negro is introduced to a group of white Frenchmen. If it is a group of intellectuals, we can be sure that the Negro will try to assert himself. He will insist that attention be paid not to the color of his skin but to the force of his intellect. There are many people in Martinique who at the age of twenty or thirty begin to steep themselves in Montesquieu or Claudel for the sole purpose of being able to quote them. That is because, through their knowledge of these writers, they expect their color to be forgotten. SK

Fifth, And this fear of the black, this negrophobia, is what turns the black into being viewed as an object of and for destruction.

Wilderson in **‘**10 [Frank B Wilderson III, Interview: Frank Wilderson, Wallowing in the Contradictions, Part 2, Conducted by Percy Howard, July 14 2010, SK]

FW I think it’s such a deep problem that it’s even hard to go ahead and think about, but we’ll try here. One of the things I didn’t get as deeply into in my book as I would have wanted to would be the work of a Black psychoanalytic scholar named David Marriott who’s down at UC Santa Cruz. And I’m not sure I have the time to do the heavy lifting of reading all his work right now, but what I can say is that he has this theoretical intervention about the unconscious which suggests that **the Black unconscious is always at war with itself because it shares something with the White unconscious which is a hatred for the** Black imago, for the **image of the Black**. I hope I can do the theory justice because I use his work in my film book but I don’t use it in the breadth and the depth that he has written in his books. He’s not trying to condemn Black people for an unconscious that has as a constituent element hatred of blackness, but he’s trying to suggest that **there is violence in the world which is coordinated with Negrophobia.** **There’s the fantasy of a Black as a phobic object, an object that will destroy you and you don’t even know how it will destroy you, just an anxious threat, you know**. And he says, okay, that’s a fantasy, but what’s important, what psychoanalysis hasn’t really figured out, is that **what’s important about this fantasy is that it is supported and coordinated with all the guns in the world**… PH Uh-huh. FW And I, the Black, can have a fantasy of white aggression, but it is not coordinated with any institutional power. PH Right. FW And he says if you go through generations, that it’s really not immediately possible for you to simply genocide that unconscious hatred of yourself because **the hatred of Black**, of the Black, **is also fundamental to being accepted in society**. So he’s saying that there is, that there’s two things happening in the Black unconscious, one is a hatred of the Black, of aggressivity towards the Black imago which is the same aggressivity that society has, so that Denzel Washington can say at the end of Training Day “I’m King Kong”, you know. You know, my God. You know? SK

And, the AC only specifies to the fear of blacks because it is one of the prevalent issues involved within the resolution, but the framing of the aC of resisting colonial and cultural subjugation applies to all groups.

### Part 2 - Advocacy

First, the text: Handguns ought to be banned in the United States to combat negrophobia. I reserve the right to clarify.

In the Status quo, gun ownership is a white domain – whites disproportionately hold more guns than blacks.

Reeves and Holmes ’15,

In addition to how they experience gun violence, black Americans and white Americans hold divergent attitudes about gun ownership. **About 41 percent of white households own guns, compared to just 19 percent of black households**, according to a 2014 Pew survey. And **white Americans** (62 percent**) are more likely than black Americans** (54 percent) **to say that gun ownership does more to protect people than endanger personal safety.** Wonkbook newsletter Your daily policy cheat sheet from Wonkblog. Sign up Those different experiences partly explain their divergent views: Whites (61 percent) are nearly twice as likely as blacks (34 percent) to say it's more important to protect gun rights than to control gun ownership, according to the Pew Research Center. Most strikingly, **black parents** (39 percent) **are nearly twice as likely as white parents** (22 percent) **to say they worry about their child getting shot,** according to a recent Pew study. When it comes to their kids, black parents worry more about shootings than about drug or alcohol use or depression. **Among white parents, the opposite is true**. Pew Research Center (Pew Research Center) Gun rights advocates often correctly point out that gun violence springs from many different sources: Suicide among older white males in the heartland is a fundamentally different issue than homicide among young black men in urban areas. This observation suggests that bringing down gun deaths would require a multi-pronged public policy approach rather than a monolithic one-size-fits-all package. But **the debate over gun violence has become so polarizing that many lawmakers** — particularly at the federal level — **have simply done nothing**. SK

#### And, these biases have real-life consequences – the issue is not *who* the guns are banned for but rather the fact that the principle of the “right to bear arms” is flawed from the outset.

Sager’13, [Josh Sager, “White Privilege and the 2nd Amendment”, SEPTEMBER 28, The Progressive Cynic, SK.]

The gun-murder epidemic in the United States has provoked a great deal of discussion about the 2nd Amendment and the right to bear arms. On one side of this argument, there is the vast majority who want increased gun control, while, on the other, there is a small, but powerful and vocal, minority of gun extremists. In the recent fights over gun control and ownership, we have seen many gun-enthusiasts claim that guns are just tools and that the simple act of owning a gun is not threatening in the slightest—in fact, these people claim that virtually everybody should be armed and trained to use guns from an early age. Despite these claims, **it is evident to anybody who cares to look that not everybody in the United States is treated equally in regard to gun ownership**. Many assume that the issues surrounding gun control are race-blind, as everybody has access to the same weapons (weapons dealers rarely see any color but green), but these people would be incorrect. **Our society’s perception of gun owners who are exercising their “2nd Amendment rights” is often linked to the color of their skin**—in this, Americans’ gun rights are extremely different depending upon who is carrying the weapon. Pro-White Gun Bias For the most part, **white Americans have a level of privilege when carrying their weapons which is simply not given to people of other races.** Other white people (who are still the majority) are far less likely to perceive a heavily armed white “good ol boy” to be a threat than if they saw the same weapons being carried by somebody of black, Hispanic or middle eastern descent. The ugly truth is, **the 2nd Amendment may be idolized by many Americans, but a significant portion of these people see it as the exclusive domain of WHITE Americans**—**if it is a brown hand holding the gun that they see as an absolute right, then they immediately think of terrorists, drug gangs, and “thugs.”** For example: When gatherings of white gun enthusiasts congregate around a business in the south (ex. in Texas), they are usually given the benefit of the doubt and not treated as potential criminal threats. Contrasting this, if a group of black youths wearing baggy clothes or a group of Muslim men wearing headscarves were to hold the same weapons in the same place, it is highly likely that the locals would soil themselves, call the police or feds, and hide in the closet clutching their assault rifles until “help” arrives. black-panthers This **pro-white bias in regard to gun-ownership is both unfair and highly ironic**. It is unfair because, if people claim that gun ownership is a constitutional right, then it would stand to reason that race and dress should be irrelevant to the exercise of that right. It is ironic, simply because a vast majority of random mass-shooters are young, isolated, white men and a vast majority of white victims are killed by white killers (86% in fact). **Racial biases in the perception of gun ownership are not just an abstract societal phenomenon, as they can have very extreme real-life consequences.** Studies have shown that Americans who see people as armed threats are more likely to shoot at them if they are not white, and are much faster to make fatal decisions. This perception of armed minorities as threats can lead to their deaths at the hands of paranoid white people who, ironically enough, often support gun ownership. Unfortunately, this type of bias extends to police officers when they are performing their duties (ex. the killing of Amadou Diallo by the NYPD). In much the same way that African Americans have been stopped for driving while black,” **racial minorities have a much harder time “exercising their 2nd Amendment rights” than white people**—they are more likely to be stopped, or even killed during the stop. SK

### Contention 1 is Ideology

Status quo supreme court rulings such as Heller substantiate that the desire to own a gun is specifically an assimilation tactic crafted by the elites and the desire to “become American”, which heightens xenophobia and creates American exclusivity.

Gulasekaram, [Pratheepan Gulasekaram (Professor of Law. Santa Clara University School of Law, J.D., Stanford Law School.), “‘THE PEOPLE’ OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT: CITIZENSHIP AND THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS”, 85 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1521 (2010). SK]

The paradox of inclusion and exclusion highlighted by this Article lies at the heart of citizenship distinctions in firearms regulations. Since the republic’s founding, when **gun rights were congruent to core political rights available to only white, propertied, first-class citizens, the associative progression of gun rights and citizenship caused a significant enlargement in the pool of eligible gun owners through the nineteenth century**. Yet, when the fundamental nature of citizenship changed in the late nineteenth century to include previously excluded Washington, and Wyoming. Id. at 922. Yet, only nine of those states maintain statutory alienage distinctions for gun possession or use. Id. at 895 nn.11–14. The remaining states that maintain alienage distinctions for arms bearing frame the right as one held by “persons” or “all men,” or have no arms-related constitutional provisions. Id. at 922. 288 See, e.g., Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 242 (1896) (Field, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (declaring that noncitizens are covered by Due Process Clause and must be accorded Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights); People v. Nakamura, 62 P.2d 246, 247 (Colo. 1936) (striking down alienage restriction in gun laws because it deprived alien of right to defend self and property); People v. Zerillo, 189 N.W. 927, 928 (Mich. 1922) (“[A] constitution like ours[ ] grant[s] to aliens who are bona fide residents of the state the same rights . . . as native-born citizens, and to every person the right to bear arms for the defense of himself and the state . . . .”); Linda S. Bosniak, Membership, Equality, and the Difference that Alienage Makes, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1047, 1060–61 & nn.42–43 (1994) (arguing that noncitizens, including undocumented immigrants, are entitled to Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendment protections in criminal proceedings, at a minimum). But see Wishnie, supra note 76, at 669, 747 (noting, but then justifying through his theory of “extraordinary speech,” First Amendment’s varied protection of different classes of noncitizens). \\server05\productn\N\NYU\85-5\NYU503.txt unknown Seq: 58 8-NOV-10 8:48 1578 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:1521 races and immigrant groups, expansion of gun rights stalled. Into the twentieth century, legislative and judicial efforts, mostly agnostic about interpretations of “the people” in the Amendment, reaffirmed latent societal fears regarding the nationality and color of those permitted to possess guns. Even as constitutional scrutiny of citizenship distinctions generally grew more strict, the white majority continued a pattern of de facto disarmament of minorities and created a complex web of firearms restrictions for noncitizens. This historical analysis shows the continued tensions in the American psyche among community, citizenship, and belonging. This Article also examined Heller’s focus on individual rights **and self-defense, as well as its** narrowing of the conception of “the people**”** in the Second Amendment. Taking Heller’s meaning and import at face value, the holding **would** seem to expand gun rights by limiting extreme state regulation, while simultaneously **contract**ing **the universe of those who may own guns and claim the Second Amendment’s protections**. Unsurprisingly then, the post-Heller world of gun regulation continues and augments the historical tension between gun rights and citizenship. As such, Heller’s citizenship talk requires considerable reconsideration and revision. **As a right of personal self-defense,** **gun ownership is connected to citizenship status tangentially at best** unless noncitizens present the primary source of armed danger within the country. **This, however, has not been the case** since the early days of the republic, when threats from British loyalists, noncitizen Native Americans, and slave insurrections occupied the attention of the citizen majority. **These same nebulous fears of danger to the citizen population from armed foreigners motivated prosecution of recently immigrated German laborers training for their defense, spurred various state alien-in-possession laws at the beginning of the twentieth century, animated debates over Hawaii’s then-nascent right-to-bear arms provision during the state’s Constitutional Convention in the 1950s, and still galvanizes arms purchases in present day**.289 But now, as was the case then, no empirical data linking specific threats to citizens from noncitizen possession have ever been proffered to substantiate these fears. Indeed, the description of key moments in the narrative of alien gun laws in Part II of this Article highlights the hyperbolized and stereotypical conceptions of noncitizen and nonwhite aggression animating regulation of noncitizen possession. Of course, one of the ironies of citizens’ concerns about noncitizen firearm possession is that personal gun ownership and the use of fire- 289 See supra Part II (discussing racial and xenophobic contours of gun regulation). \\server05\productn\N\NYU\85-5\NYU503.txt unknown Seq: 59 8-NOV-10 8:48 November 2010] “THE PEOPLE” OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT 1579 arms for private ends is a uniquely American ethos, anathema to most immigrants.290 If noncitizens are not a unique violent threat to the citizenry, then firearms regulations of noncitizens are justifiable only when citizens’ arms possession accompanies concomitant arms-related duties and obligations to the state or to state watchdog militias. But neither Heller nor contemporary gun advocates recommend conditioning gun ownership on public-oriented duties. If anything, the absence of required military service for citizens, combined with federal laws allowing for—in fact, incentivizing—noncitizen military service, evince a specific desire to expand public-oriented, state-protective gun ownership beyond citizens. Those attempting to possess guns as a safeguard against governmental tyranny—the so-called modern militia movement—are a minority fringe, often too tainted with racial or religious prejudice or xenophobic fervor to be treated as legitimate citizen endeavors tasked with guarding against state tyranny.291 Moreover, immigration law requires that those wishing to become citizens express their political beliefs through nonviolent and orderly expressions.292 Stripped of these justifications, state or federal firearms restrictions on noncitizens appear grounded only in irrational and unsupportable fears about foreigners or a desire to make citizenship more valuable for its own sake. **Linking gun rights with other citizenship rights imbues citizenship with** greater substantive value**, constructing it as the legal category triggering the rights of both self-rule and self defense**. But unlike with other citizenship rights, the limitation of the right to armed self-defense finds no independent support or rationale save a desire to keep instruments of deadly violence as a privilege of citizenship and a survival advantage for citizens. 290 Arie Bauer et al., A Comparison of Firearms-Related Legislation on Four Continents, 22 MED. & L. 105, 107 (2003) (“The acquisition of firearms by private individuals in the USA is easier than in most other western countries.”); Michael C. Dorf, What Does the Second Amendment Mean Today?, 76 CHI-KENT L. REV. 291, 330 (2001) (noting that no constitutions written since fall of communism contain right-to-bear-arms provisions). 291 See Holthouse, supra note 24, at 11–12 (discussing increasing credence given by militia groups to “fringe conspiracy theories”); see also Jesse McKinley & Malia Wollan, New Border Fear: Violence by a Rogue Militia, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 27, 2009, at A9, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/27/us/27arizona.html (“[Minutemen patrols at the U.S.- Mexico border] initially drew praise from some political leaders, including Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger of California, but also raised concerns that the activities were thin veils for racism and xenophobia.”). 292 8 U.S.C. § 1424(a) (2006) (barring naturalization of those associated with or advocating overthrow of government by force); id. § 1427(a)(3) (requiring “attach[ment] to the principles of the Constitution” and “good moral character”). \\server05\productn\N\NYU\85-5\NYU503.txt unknown Seq: 60 8-NOV-10 8:48 1580 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:1521 **Thus, the irony of noncitizen exclusion from gun rights** enabled by Heller **is that it irreparably undermines the opinion’s watershed interpretation of the Second Amendment**. Our legal and political regime simply cannot bear the significance of the right to bear arms and the meaning of “the people,” when one is read expansively and the other interpreted jealously. In light of history, text, and logic, “the people” of the Second Amendment must include more than citizens. Indeed, devoid of ad hoc—and ultimately unjustifiable—exceptions, “the people” may comprehend several classes of persons. Nonviolent felons293 and even undocumented persons can present colorable claims to exercise the right of reasonable armed self-defense. “The people” in the Second Amendment, as it does elsewhere in the Federal Constitution, resists easy mapping onto the terrain of citizenship and noncitizenship. One possibility is that the phrase is akin to “nation” in that it refers to a nebulous concept based in shared meaning and aspiration. Like “nation,” it does not itself provide bright-line limitations on who might be included within that aspiration, allowing for expansion and contraction as the republic evolves. Or, as Justice Kennedy suggested, “the people” might refer to the importance of a right, as opposed to the class it delimits.294 Both fail to explain how or why the Second Amendment mandates limitations of its guarantees to citizens. The preceding analysis illuminates the profound implications of Justice Scalia’s description of those to whom the right to bear arms inures. More importantly, it exposes the interpretative and doctrinal difficulties with limiting “the people” of the Federal Constitution to citizens. SK

And, this makes guns the representation of Colonialism, which makes the 1ac a symbolic rejection of colonialism. Also, the desire to own handguns are specifically a form of assimilation and the desire to “become American”

Riley, [Riley, Angela R. "Indians and Guns." Geo. LJ 100 (2011): 1675. SK]

Through a different lens, **the history of Indians and guns is a story about becoming American**. In colonial America, **rights and obligations related to guns were often tied to race**, **and** race, **in turn, was tied to citizenship**. **The sovereign authority to define who was in and who was out was deployed to exclude “undesirables,”** including Indians. **But the extension of citizenship**—for Indians, the moment came officially in 1924—**marked the inclusion** of Indians **into the polity of the United States**. From here, Indians could assert rights as individual American citizens under the United States Constitution. **The “citizenship theory”** of Indians and guns, then, **is one in which** Indians may strongly adhere to the view that **gun ownership**—particularly in the defense of self, as articulated in Heller—**is a distinctly American right**. This view supports tribal claims that all citizens should be guaranteed individual gun rights, particularly in light of state failures to protect them from harm. A final, related viewpoint contemplates the history of Indians and guns as anaccount of racial hierarchy and social control, deeply pronounced at the point of contact and through the early years of the republic but tenaciously embedded in much of American law. This narrative reveals that **the relationship** of Indians and guns **developed in parallel to African-Americans and guns, with both groups situated at the bottom of a racial hierarchy that facilitated oppression**, **noncitizen status, and subjugation**. Here, **as a means of extracting wealth**—**with African slaves, their labor**; with Indians, their lands—**the gun served as a tool of white privilege**, forever **linked to a history of** violence and **oppression**. The “race theory,” then, connects guns to a complex dynamic of racial status and domination, which may, in turn, motivate contemporary tribal governments to reject a commitment to individualized gun rights.

Third, opposition to gun control and the desire to hold guns in *contemporary society* is based on a fear of black power and a fear of blacks – Historical analysis is not as important *in the context of gun control -* the 1AC’s psychological examination is key.

O’Brien **et al ‘**13**,** [O’Brien, Kerry, et al. "Racism, gun ownership and gun control: Biased attitudes in US whites may influence policy decisions." (2013): e77552. SK]

**Stronger opposition to gun control by US whites has not always been the case**. **During the civil rights movement** of the late 60 s, black activists exercised their right to carry loaded firearms in order to provide protection from police and extreme white factions [13]. The response from **US whites** was to **demand[ed] stricter gun control**. The Mulford Act was signed into law by Californian governor Ronald Reagan in 1967, and prohibited the carrying of loaded firearms in public [13]. **The social landscape has changed considerably, and most recent data indicates a quite different view on gun control by whites**, with 53% of whites wanting to protect the right to own guns, whereas only 24% of blacks do [14]. People’s stated reasons for owning guns and opposing gun-control legislation are likely complex; however, it has been suggested that **sociocultural factors such as fear of black violence may be associated with** gun ownership, and with **opposition to gun controls** [15], [16]. Similarly, **negative attitudes towards blacks** (i.e., racism), along with conservative and political ideologies, **appear to be related to fear of black violence** and crime [17]–[20]. What is not known, and accordingly is the focus of this study, is whether racism is associated with gun ownership and opposition to gun control. It has been found that racial stereotypes (e.g., that blacks are violent) are related to US whites’ fears of violence from blacks, and to their support for crime-related policy measures, such as building prisons, and the death penalty [19], [20]. Support for such policies is particularly pronounced in US whites who hold higher levels of racism [19]. Strong evidence also supports the notion that negative racial stereotypes and attitudes are related to people’s perceptions of threat from black gun-related violence [20]. Additionally, US research using measures of implicit race attitudes (e.g., Implicit Association Test; IAT) have shown a preference for whites over blacks [21] and appear to influence people’s political decisions, and even choices of medical procedures for blacks [22]–[24]. For instance, measures of explicit and implicit racism measures predicted opposition to Obama’s health reforms [23]. Most prominently, symbolic racism (racial resentment), an explicit but subtle form and measure of racism, has been found to be consistently related to peoples decisions regarding policies that may affect non-white US citizens. It is argued that **symbolic racism supplanted old-fashioned or overt/blatant racism which had seen blacks as amoral and inferior**, and was associated with open support for race inequality and segregation under ‘Jim Crow Laws’ [25]. Research following the US civil-rights movement suggested that anti-black racism and stereotyping, as assessed by blatant measures, had declined [26]. However, subsequent research revealed that people may merely be reluctant to express racism and negative stereotyping on these blatant measures in order to avoid appearing racist [27], [28]. This observation led to the conceptualization and measurement of more subtle measures of racism, such as, symbolic racism [25]. Symbolic racism is a belief structure underpinned by both anti-black affect and traditional values [29]. The anti-black affect (racism) component of symbolic racism is said to be established in pre-adult years through exposure to negative black stereotypes (e.g. blacks as dangerous, blacks are lazy), to the point that phenomena such as crime and physical violence have become typified as black phenomena [30]. **The anti-black affect is not necessarily conscious** or deliberative, but may be felt as fear, anger, unease, and hostility towards blacks [29], [31], [32]. The symbolic component reflects the abstract view of blacks as a collective rather than as individuals, as well as its basis in abstract white moralistic reasoning and traditions. Because symbolic racism represents an ingrained schema, individuals high in symbolic racism will react in a negative manner, often unconsciously, to issues perceived to involve a racial (i.e. black) component. Psychometric work shows that while symbolic racism has a small relationship with old-fashioned or blatant racism and stereotypes, only **symbolic racism is associated with policy preferences related to race** after controlling for conservative and political ideology and demographic characteristics (e.g., education, gender, age) [33]. Policies of which blacks or whites are the intended or obvious beneficiaries (e.g. affirmative action, school busing) should easily be perceived as involving a racial component. **But other policies may also involve a perceived racial component merely because they concern an issue that is already understood by whites in racial** (black) **terms**. Thus, symbolic racism has been linked to opposition to and support for a range of policies that whites consistently associate with blacks (e.g., welfare), even if it is not in the self-interest of whites to do so [22]–[25], [32]. This is also likely to explain the frequently observed correlations between symbolic racism and public opinion regarding a range of criminal justice policies (e.g. death penalty, mandatory sentences). There is substantial evidence that whites associate blacks with crime, and especially violent crime [19], [30]. The result of this conflation of race and crime is that whites high on symbolic racism will support policies that are perceived as being tough on crime and oppose policies that are considered lenient. Green and colleagues [34] have found a positive relationship between symbolic racism and punitive crime policies (i.e., death penalty, three strikes imprisonment), and negative correlation with policies that are intended to assist criminals (i.e., education of inmates, poverty reduction). And although conservative ideologies and racism are inherently related, symbolic racism makes a unique contribution to crime policy attitudes after accounting for other race-neutral factors (e.g., conservatism, crime victimization, crime news exposure, and socio-demographics) [34]. More generally, **symbolic racism should also correlate with** fear of crime and black violence, along with attitudes to policies that may reduce, or increase, perceived threat (e.g., gun ownership, **gun control**). **Self-protection and physical safety (e.g., fear) are the most commonly cited reason for owning a gun and opposing gun control** and blacks are overrepresented in the crime statistics and media portrayals of violent crime. Accordingly, **people with higher symbolic racism may be more likely to own a gun and oppose gun control as a means of dealing** (consciously or unconsciously) **with abstract fears regarding blacks** [19]. Given the importance of guns and gun-control to US public health, and the urgent need for appropriate policy to reduce gun-related harms, **it is vital to examine the psychological** and sociocultural **reasons for the paradoxical attitudes of many US citizens and politicians to gun-control.** **US whites have twice the rate of gun ownership of blacks, oppose gun control to much greater extent than blacks,** but are considerably more likely to kill themselves with those guns, than be killed by others or blacks. While the literature suggests that racism in whites shapes fear of black violence and support for policies that disadvantage blacks, no research has examined whether racism is related to gun ownership and attitudes to gun-control in US whites. This study investigated whether racism is related to gun ownership and opposition to gun control in US whites. We hypothesized that, after accounting for known confounders (i.e., age, gender, education, income, location, conservatism, political identification, anti-government sentiment), anti-black racism would be associated with having a gun in the home, and opposition to gun controls. SK

### Contention 2 is Police

#### The legality of guns enables the presumption that all black people will own guns. This allows police to shoot blacks with impunity with no recourse from the Criminal Justice System which pins the possibility of the existence of a gun as a threat, justifying police action.

Lee ’04,

**Because so many incidents of police force against Blacks and other minorities go unreported, it is easy for those living comfortable lives in middle- or upper-class neighborhoods to believe that police abuse of force is uncommon.** **The United States Supreme Court** reflects this type of ostrich-with-its-head-in-the-sand mentality when it **treats acts of police brutality as aberrations or as isolated incidents**.67 For example, in 1983, the Supreme Court in City of Los Angeles v. Lyons68 reversed a preliminary injunction issued by a lower federal court prohibiting Los Angeles police officers from using the chokehold unless threatened with death or serious bodily injury. The Court vacated the injunction on the ground that Adolph Lyons, a Black man who was stopped by Los Angeles police officers for a traffic violation and without any provocation on his part was subjected to a chokehold that rendered him unconscious and damaged his larynx, lacked standing to sue since Lyons was not likely to be stopped again by the Los Angeles police and subjected to a chokehold.69 The Court’s refusal to see Lyons’s case as part of a pattern and practice by the Los Angeles police department was particularly disturbing in light of the fact that between 1975 and 1980, more than a dozen people, a significant number of them Black, died after being subjected to chokeholds by Los Angeles police officers.70 65. Anna Gorman, Fired Officer to Face Retrial, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2004, at B1. 66. Kimberly Edds, Calif. Policeman Won’t Be Tried Again, WASH. POST, Feb. 7, 2004, at A11. 67. Bandes, supra note 26 (noting the judicial tendency to view instances of police misconduct as isolated rather than systemic); David Dante Troutt, Screws, Koon, and Routine Aberrations: The Use of Fictional Narratives in Federal Police Brutality Prosecutions, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 18 (1999) (arguing that authority narratives are used to justify acts of police brutality). 68. 461 U.S. 95 (1983). 69. Id. at 111. 70. DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 162 (1999) (“By the time Lyons’s case reached the Supreme Court, sixteen persons had been killed by police use of the chokehold; twelve of the victims were black men.”). According to Human Rights Watch, the Los Angeles police department still permits its officers to use the chokehold. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra DRAFT 3/4/05 12:12 PM 18 HASTINGS RACE AND POVERTY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 2 Perhaps to the extent that a law enforcement officer mistook a candy bar for a gun, the Andre Burgess case is unique. However, **to the extent that a law enforcement officer “saw” a weapon in an unarmed Black man’s hand, the case is not at all unique. Many unarmed Black men have been shot by law enforcement officers who thought, or claimed they thought, the Black male suspect had a gun.** For example, two months after Andre Burgess was shot, another young Black man was shot and killed because a police officer thought he was armed. This Black man was “armed” with a set of keys. SK

Police brutality - police disproportionately target blacks (true statement) and blame it on the fact that they "thought they had a gun (usually handgun)". Banning handguns gets rid of this excuse for policemen which also means (a) justice in CJS is more likely, as justices cannot blame the presence of a gun as a problem as the presumption is that individuals do not have guns (b) combat Negrophobia by making it punishable which will solve in the long term (c) spikes out self-defense stuff because blacks won't need to defend themselves and letting them own handguns only increases the violence against them.

#### And, the movement to ban handguns from the federal government allows citizens to gain power against the state, minimizing police brutality.

Vaid, [Virtual Equality: The Mainstreaming of Gay and Lesbian Liberation By Urvashi Vaid. SK]

Three kinds of **antiviolence movements** **operate** in this country: **the citizen-action model** of communities mobilizing to mount patrols, run neighborhood watch campaigns, and try **to make the streets and neighborhoods safe**; the victim-services movement that staffs rape crisis lines, domestic violence centers, gay- and lesbian-specific service organizations, crime victims' support groups; and the racial justice movement that has organized against police brutality, state-sanctioned violence, and violence against people of color in general. Each of these antiviolence movements organizes around the framework of civil rights; **each argues that we have the right to be safe in our person and property regardless of who**, where, what **we are**. **Each pursues legal reforms through legislative activity-to** stiffen penalties, **ban handguns**, mandate tougher sentences, secure funds for service delivery, increase police patrols, found community-review boards, and much more. **Each engages in education aimed at more understanding, awareness, prevention, and support for victims of violence**. **All of these have been instrumental in securing a modicum of responsiveness from the state** to the problem of violence. SK

### Contention 3 is Black on Black Violence

#### Negrophobia and black-on-black violence are mutually reinforcing – the existence of black on black violence, which is usually covered up, justifies the state’s implicit Negrophobia in controlling and disenfranchising black bodies – the incorporation of this aspect of violence is necessary for any analysis that does not start out from the viewpoint of Negrophobia.

Chaney and Robertson ’13,

It should not come as a surprise that **White supremacy creates negative media portrayals of people of color as criminals, disproportionately incarcerates and racially profiles people of color**, **and is the impetus behind the growth of the prison industrial complex which is an outgrowth of slavery** (Blackmon, 2009; Butler, 2009; Tonry, 2011). This mass incarceration has emasculated and resulted in caste-like status for African-American males to such a degree that legal scholar Michelle Alexander described this phenomenon as a modern Jim Crow system (Alexander, 2010). Media marketing pioneer Tom Burrell (2010) suggested **portrayals of innate Black inferiority in the media desensitize the American public to the deaths of Black youth**. Burrell (2010) refers to this situation as the “paradox of progress” (p. 4), **which essentially fuels the erroneous notion that our nation has moved beyond the issue of race.** Therefore, when Black and Latino families are trapped in crime-ridden, blighted urban communities, their condition is viewed as a result of their own pathological cultural practices. On the one hand, **when children of color in these communities are killed, their deaths are practically seen as excusable**, however when White children lose their lives, the media promotes these deaths as national tragedies (Burrell, 2010; Butler, 2010; Tonry, 2011). Not surprisingly, Loewen (2007) noted “that for the first time in this century, young White adults have less tolerant attitudes toward Black Americans than those over thirty” (p. 171). Moreover, perspectives such as, “if they were not pathological,” or “if they possessed strong family values” these types of things would not occur become the norm. Finally, **negative portrayals of Black life and Black deaths in the media support the concept of negrophobia**, **which is an unfounded** **fear** (buttressed by negative media portrayals of Blacks) **of Blacks, the normalization of Black deaths, and that Whites will be the victims of Black on White violence** (Armour, 1997). Conversely, Burrell (2010) contended **the** media’s Black inferiority **campaign desensitized Blacks to the death of members of their own group, made them unconcerned about Black-on-Black violence in their own blighted urban communities, and made them** considerably **more likely to rally around the issue of White on Black crime**. SK

#### Black on black killing creates real tangible death that must be stopped – guns are a scourge.

Harper ’86,

According to the National Center for Health Statistics, **the murder rate of blacks by blacks for males age 15 to 24 is 73 per 100,000** population compared with 12.5 per 100,000 for the same age group of white males.' In August 1984, the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) stated that **black-on-black killing has become a national epidemic.** According to the most recent survey of the Bureau of Justice Statistics, there is one chance in twenty one that a black American male will be murdered. These odds are about six times greater than those confronting white men.9 Dr. James Ralph, a black psychiatrist and chief of NIMH's Center for Minority Group Mental Health recently said, "**The killing has to stop**."' 0 It is only hoped that this sentiment is shared by all Americans both black and white." **Our nation should be stunned by these appalling statistics, and make a national commitment to bring about a significant change**. Measured by any yardstick-law and order, human tragedy, finance-**the easy access to private ownership and the use of guns has become a menace to our society.** 1 **2 A sampling of the tangible and intangible tragedies interwoven in the handgun menace indicates that over $500 million is spent annually in hospital care nationwide for handgun wounds**.' 3 **Annually, handguns take the lives of over twenty thousand individuals, many of whom are black** and have potential average lifetime earnings of $116,000.'4 Thousands of families thereby reduced to welfare for want of a breadwinner. **The needless death of so many black young men has increased the hardships** that already face the black community. SK

#### A ban on private possession of handguns would solve violence. Handguns are the primary cause within black communities and communities of actual black death as these are the communities that cannot necessarily afford other guns. Also, those who necessarily own guns for self-protection would switch to long guns whereas those who actually get guns for killing others do not have that access. No matter, what, the 1AC is the first step to change.

Harper ’86,

**A** strict permit system a ban on private possession of handguns **would significantly alter the firearms habits of law-abiding citizens**, **who would then turn to safer, long guns for self-protection**. Hence, the twenty-five hundred handgun deaths and 100,000 accidental handgun woundings that take place every year cannot be excluded from measurement. 79 **Cheap handguns, commonly categorized as a "Saturday night special"'8 " should be banned altogether.** **This would deny many people access to a common source of an instrument of violence**,' 8' **the most common weapon obtained and found in the streets of our community**. **Cutting off this major supply of handguns should bring about a reduction in the number of gun homicides in our nation**. **Enforcing and modifying our current gun laws will not completely alleviate the societal detriment** caused by their presence, **but it is undoubtedly a viable method destined for use in efforts to rectify the problems permeating our social structure**. We must stop the killing, and the **banning of cheap guns and the enforcement of current gun laws seems to be an appropriate beginning**. SK

### Part 3 – Implications

First, we as students have the obligation to decolonize our minds and participate in a constant anti-racist mode of questioning which requires an analysis into the way in which brain processes influence anti-racist action – this method is not isolated to African Americans - this is what the 1AC was.

Unsal in ’06, [UNSAL, SERHAT. "’Implicit Racism and the Brain: How Neurobiology can inform an Anticolonial, Anti-racist Pedagogy’." Anti-colonialism and Education: The Politics of Resistance, Chapter 3 of Anti-Colonialism and Education by George Jerry Sefa Dei, A. Kempf (Rotterdam: Sense Publishers, 2006) (2006): 63-86. SK]

a result, overt racism as a function of self-report has declined. However, **racism still persists** within the fabric of society. within the depths of cultural memory. and **as a motivator of racist behaviour and thought**. The research highlighted in this paper. for example. can shed light on how people who profess not to be racists in social circles among friends can become racial profilers in a work setting as they move from one socio-cultural context to another - one in which racial bias is taboo to another in which bias can still readily be expressed. For the first time, \ve can now **observ[ing]**e **how** **bias and prejudice have been** learned and **internalized in the structures of the brain**; this **means we may** therefore **be able to develop better strategies to challenge racism**. And now we know that **merely becoming aware of** one's own **racist tendencies is not enough.** For many, being aware of racism just forces them to control their behavioural responses that may have been deemed taboo by society. More than anything. recent brain research aflinns that the "management model" of racial sensitivity training, etc., has not yielded the intended results of diminishing racism. **What is required is** **an**other **approach** altogether - one that has been **practised by indigenous populations** in colonized lands for centuries: it includes **a strategy of decolonizing our minds and** consists of **a systematic anti-racist inquiry that allows us to question the nature of reality** (and history) **paired with the anti-colonial practice of interrogating how colonial relations underpin the different and negative evaluations of skin colour.** Anti-colonial pedagogy. according to George Sefa Dei. would include "inter- rogations of colonial representations and imaginaries examining processes and representations of legitimacy and degeneracy through the mutually constitutive relations of power" (Dei, 2004, p. 3). **It is important for students to develop an interest in studying the history of colonialism as well as the political economic re- lations that underpin systems of colonial domination**. This point Inust be stressed. since "in the study of colonial relations. there is and should be no claim to "in- nocence" [or a] moral distancing" (Del, 2004, p. 4). In this way, **we may begin to challenge the automatic denial of complicity and self-assumed neutrality that is especially exhibited by those in dominant social positions**. This is especially important since research into the formation of automatic prejudices has shown that situational power inï¬‚uences prejudice formation. In psychological experiments. Richeson and Ambady (2003, p. 181) have shown that "individuals holding a powerful position for an upcoming intergroup interaction were more biased than individuals holding a less powerful position". **This provides a great impetus** and urgency **for a critical interrogation** of the present unequal distribution **of class power** and how this negatively inï¬‚uences social and personal development. According to Phelps et al. (2000, p. 734). **understanding the underlying processes and mechanisms of the formation and expression of indirect racial bias** "can initiate discovery of the means by which they are learned and modulated". Such inquiries also possess "the potential to shift the orthodox thinking about the separation of social, mental, and physical spheres, revealing how social learning and evaluation are rooted in the ordinary mechanics of the mind". What are the means through which implicit prejudices are learned? The following section will explore this question. SK

Second, The judge has the obligation vote up arguments that promote a discourse that embodies an anti-racist perspective. This should be your primary concern because any other benefit in the debate sphere can only be accessed by an equal space for dialogue. We are a prerequisite to fairness.

Smith, [Smith, Elijah. History maker, A Conversation in Ruins: Race and Black Participation in Lincoln Douglas Debate. SK]

It will be uncomfortable, it will be hard, and **it will require continued effort but the necessary step in fixing this problem,** like all problems, **is the community as a whole admitting that such a problem** with many “socially acceptable” choices **exists** in the first place. Like all systems of social control, the reality of racism in debate is constituted by the singular choices that institutions, coaches, and students make on a weekly basis.I have watched countless rounds where **competitors attempt to win by rushing to abstractions** to distance the conversation from the material reality that black debaters are forced to deal with every day. One of the students I coached, who has since graduated after leaving debate, had an adult judge write out a ballot that concluded by “hypothetically” defending my student being lynched at the tournament. Another debate concluded with a young man defending that we can kill animals humanely, “just like we did that guy Troy Davis”.Community norms would have competitors do intellectual gymnastics or make up rules to accuse black debaters of breaking to escape hard conversations butas someone who understands that experience, **the only constructive strategy is to acknowledge the reality of the oppressed, engage the discussion from the perspective of authors who are black and brown, and** then **find strategies to deal with the issues** at hand. It hurts to see competitive seasons come and go and have high school students and judges spew the same hateful things you expect to hear at a Klan rally. **A student should not, when presenting an advocacy that aligns them with the oppressed, have to justify why oppression is bad. Debate is** not just a game, **but a learning environment with liberatory potential.** Even if the form debate gives to a conversation is not the same you would use to discuss race in general conversation with Bayard Rustin or Fannie Lou Hamer, that is not a reason we have to strip that conversation of its connection to a reality that black students cannot escape. **Current** coaches and **competitors** alike **dismiss concerns of racism and exclusion,** won’t teach other students anything about identity in debate other than how to shut down competitors who engage in alternative styles and discourses, **and refuse to engage** in those discussionseven outside of a tournament setting. A conversation on privilege and identity was held at a debate institute I worked at this summer and just as any theorist of privilege would predict it was the heterosexual, white, male staff members that either failed to make an appearance or stay for the entire discussion. No matter how talented they are, we have to remember that the students we work with are still just high school aged children.If those who are responsible for participants and the creation of accessible norms won't risk a better future for our community, it becomes harder to explain to students who look up to them why risking such an endeavor is necessary.As a student provided with the opportunity and privilege of participation by the Jersey Urban Debate League, I can remember plenty of tournaments in high school where the only black students at the tournament were individuals from my high school. It was a world shattering experience; no one spoke to us first and those we did approach didn’t have to acknowledge the fact that, every weekend, our failures and successes made us the representatives of black America in the minds of students and judges that never had to freely associate with black people. The irony of participation for black students is that to understand your existence in an academic, usually white, space throws that very space into question. They are both told that joining debate will make you smarter, more personable, and better able to communicate; however those who are already there don’t speak to them, they don’t vote for them, and they don’t associate with them. The unanswered question, then, is “For which bodies does LD exist?” **Continuing to parade LD under the guise of neutrality will reproduce the problem at hand.** Hiring practices, Judge Preferences /Strike Sheets, invitations to Round Robins, and who coaches don’t require their students to associate with all contribute to the problem at hand because they “accidentally” forget to include people of color. When only two major debate workshops bothered to hire anyone black to work with their students this summer it spoke to the reality of which bodies are seen as being competent enough to teach. Their skills as pedagogues weren’t dismissed because they aren’t qualified, but because they are black **.If we are to confront structural discrimination** against the black community, **we** can’t retreat to a defense of neutrality **but have to take strides in addressing and ending the cycle of exclusion.** If black students do not feel comfortable participating in LD they will lose out on the ability to judge, coach, or to force debate to deal with the truth of their perspectives.SK

and, discussions about all other forms of oppression is fine, but rejecting the 1ac due to a focus on a specific group is bad because it is impossible to highlight the specificity of the oppression faced by groups in merely the 1AC, which makes for a bad model of debate in which everything will be discussed in general terms with no actual solutions.

Third, The 1AC’s liberation ethics are efforts to radically change politics - we step away from pure pessimism and criticism through a policy with a specific goal.

Wilderson in ’10, [Frank b. Wilderson 10 III, Prof at UC Irvine, speaking on a panel on literary activism at the National Black Writers Conference, March 26, "Panel on Literary Activism", transcribed from the video available at http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/id/222448, begins at roughly 49:10]

Typically what I mean when I ask myself whether or not people will like or accept my reading, what I'm really trying to say to myself whether or not people will like or accept me and this is a difficult thing to overcome especially for a black writer because we are not just black writers, we are black people and **as black people we live every day of our lives in an anti-black world**. A world that defines itself in a very fundamental ways in constant distinction from us, we live everyday of our lives in a context of daily rejection so its understandable that we as black writers might strive for acceptance and appreciation through our writing, as I said this gets us tangled up in the result. The lessons we have to learn as writers resonate with what I want to say about literature and political struggle. I am a political writer which is to say **my writing is self consciously about radical change but when I have worked as an activist in political movements, my labor has been intentional and goal oriented**. For example, I organized, with a purpose to say free Mumia Abu Jamal, to free all political prisoners, or to abolish the prison industrial complex here in the United States or in South Africa, I have worked to abolish apartheid and unsuccessfully set up a socialist state whereas I want my poetry and my fiction, my creative non fiction and my theoretical writing to resonate with and to impact and impacted by those tangible identifiable results, I think that something really debilitating will happen to the writing, that it the writing will be hobbled if and when I become clear in the ways that which **I want my writing to have an impact on political struggle** what I am trying to say when I say that I want to be unclear is I don't want to clarify, I do not want to clarify the impact that my work will have or should have on political struggle, is that **the relationship of literature to struggle is not one of causality but one of accompaniment**, when I write I want to hold my political beliefs and my political agenda loosely. I want to look at my political life the way I might look at a solar eclipse which is to say look indirectly, look arie, in this way I might be able to liberate my imagination and go to places in the writing that I and other black people go to all the time the places that are too dangerous to go to and too dangerous to speak about when one is trying to organize people to take risk or when a political organization is presetting a list of demands, I said at the beginning this is an anti-black world. Its anti black in places I hate like apartheid South Africa and apartheid America and it’s anti-black in the places I don't hate such as Cuba, I've been involved with some really radical political movements but none of them have called for an end of the world but if I can get away from the result of my writing, **if** I can think of **my writing** as something that **accompanies political struggle** as opposed to something that will cause political struggle **then** maybe just maybe **I will be able to explore forbidden territory**, the unspoken demands that the world come to an end, the thing that I can’t say when I am trying to organize maybe I can harness the energy of the political movement **to make breakthroughs in the imagination that the movement can't always accommodate**, if its to maintain its organizational capacity.